





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A

BRIEF EXAMINATION

INTO THE INCREASE

OF THE

REVENUE, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION,

OF

GREAT-BRITAIN,

DURING

THE ADMINISTRATION OF

THE RT. HON. WILLIAM PITT;

WITH ALLUSIONS TO

SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED
IN THAT PERIOD,

AND A SKETCH OF

MR. PITT'S CHARACTER.

BY

THE RIGHT HON. GEORGE ROSE, M.P.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Tract on the Finances, Commerce, and Navigation of Great Britain, and one published in 1792, were written, in the first instance, to shew how the difficulties of our situation on Mr. Pitt coming into government at the close of the American War (then by many thought insurmountable) had been overcome in the interval of Peace by the general spirit of the nation well directed, and its resources wisely called forth; and in the next to demonstrate that the measures adopted to preserve its credit (during a war unprecedented from the importance of the events

events which happened, as well as from the immensity of the expence unavoidably incurred in it), not only enabled provision to be made for all the exigencies of the contest, but were attended by a rapid increase of our manufactures, our commerce, and navigation; and that notwithstanding a very large addition of new burthens, the Old Taxes continued to improve in their receipt. With a view also in both cases by plain statements of facts intelligible to all (which no attempt has been made to controvert) to enable even the most uninstructed in such matters to form a fair judgement of the wisdom, the expediency, and the success of the proceedings of those in whose hands the administration of the affairs of the Kingdom then was.

These two Tracts being now out of print, I am induced to re-publish the latter, and to continue the statements to the present time, to shew the still further improved situation of the country at the latest period to which they

they can be made up; not only to do honour to the memory of that illustrious Statesman, to whose enlightened mind, intuitive perception, and unceasing industry, the merit of conceiving and directing the measures alluded to is almost exclusively due; but in the hope that the course pursued by him, which has produced effects so highly beneficial, may not be interrupted. I will at the same time confess that the assertions made in Parliament, immediately after Mr. Pitt's death, which were most industriously and extensively circulated without doors, that he found the country in a flourishing, and left it in a ruined state, were an additional inducement to me to call the attention of the Public to undoubted facts.

I proceed first to lay before them again the statements made in 1799, in the same form and nearly in the same words in which they were originally published.

A

BRIEF EXAMINATION,

§c. §c.

THERE has been no period in the history of this country, in which so much anxiety has been shewn to inform the public fully and clearly of the true state of its finances, as in the last twelve or fourteen years; however honestly or faithfully they may have been managed formerly, it was almost impossible for a true judgement to be formed on the subject, except by those who had the conduct of them. The mode of keeping the accounts (complicated of necessity in some respects, from the various appropriations, and ill ad-

B

apted

apted to a revenue, extended and increased to a size not foreseen by our ancestors) has been simplified, and they are now produced to the public with details intelligible by all. Investigations have been made by Committees of the House of Commons with great labour and accuracy, which have been attended with the advantage not only of familiarizing several persons of weight and consideration in the country with the accounts of the receipt and expenditure of the public money, but of producing statements of both, made with care and ability, from the most authentic sources, in a form plain, distinct, and satisfactory.*

Nothing

* Much praise cannot be bestowed, in this respect, on the Administration during the American war, or on the vigilance of the gentlemen who opposed it, as there is not a trace in the Journals of an account of all the taxes having been called for, during that war, till the account published in the Report of the Finance-Committee in 1782, in which report it is observed :
 “ That imagining it might be satisfactory to the House to
 “ judge whether, among other causes, the old taxes may have
 “ been affected by those imposed within the period of their
 “ instructions, the Committee thought it right to call for an
 “ account of the nett produce of all the taxes from 1774 to
 “ 1782,

Nothing can tend more to give confidence than such a practice ;—it was with a view to assist in the attainment of so important an object, that, at the end of the first seven years of the peace, in January 1792, a small work was published under the title of “ A “ Brief Examination into the Increase of the “ Revenue, Commerce, and Navigation, of “ Great Britain, since the Conclusion of the “ Peace in 1783.” The enquiry was then thought useful, to show what difficulties had been overcome, by the general spirit of the nation, well directed ; to shew, as the opening of that pamphlet expressed, how vain the doubts and fears had been, which many of the most experienced men in the kingdom had entertained as to the ability of Great Britain to emerge from the depression of public credit to which the American war had reduced

“ 1782, distinguishing each year ;” but as that account consisted of more than an hundred and fifty *items*, put together in a confused manner, not totalled either by the officer of the exchequer or the Committee, the result could not be stated : it would, otherwise, have been notorious, how much the old taxes had fallen off.

her, to re-establish her finances, and to regain her prosperity at home or her influence abroad ; to shew the extent of her resources if properly called forth, the power of those resources if wisely applied, and the comparative situation she had by that time attained ; as well as to trace the public measures by which she had attained it ; and to recommend a perseverance in those measures, as the best means of maintaining her elevation and happiness.

Such were the inducements of the writer *then*, and he hopes justice was done to them : but there are stronger and more commanding motives *now* for a similar investigation. During the seven years previous to 1792, the measures pursued for the restoration of the public credit and finances were essential, indeed, to the prosperity of this country ; but of how much greater consequence must those appear, on which, during the seven years since that period, have depended her safety and existence !

A review,

A review, therefore, of the means by which, during a war the most eventful, and necessarily the most expensive, in which the nation was ever engaged, she has been able to preserve her credit unimpaired, to provide for the exigencies of that war, and to look forward with confidence to a provision for future contingencies, must certainly be in the highest degree interesting to every friend of his country: it is material to shew that our exertions have been proportioned to the emergency, and it is encouraging to be able to prove, that they have been successful.

In the pamphlet of 1792, a comparison was drawn between the state of our revenue at that period, and in 1783; between the depressed state in which the close of that war had left us, and the prosperous one to which we had been raised by the exertions of Government, aided by the spirit and energy of the people. It is our intention at present to compare the state of the nation in 1792, after
a con-

a considerable period of peace, of which the advantages had been improved by the unremitting attention and most assiduous endeavours of the Government, with its situation after a second period of seven years, during six of which we have been at war: such a war as called for the most extensive operations in different quarters of the globe. If a comparison, instituted on such terms, shall exhibit the country in its present state powerful in exertion, and more flourishing in revenue, commerce, and manufacture, than in those days of tranquillity and ease, and still prosperous in point of credit and fertile in resource, we may certainly indulge, without being deemed extravagantly sanguine, the consciousness of native vigour and inherent energy, which difficulties and danger rather awaken than impair.

This might be exhibited in result merely, without tracing the means by which that result has been accomplished. But this would
be

be an offering to our pride, without affording a lesson for our instruction. It will be more useful, and surely not less gratifying, to enumerate the principal steps which led to this situation, that the public may judge of their effects; and, if convinced of their utility, may continue to pursue them.

Those considerations are now of an importance much more wide and extensive, than at the time when the Publication, above alluded to, appeared*. At that time, the author of such a statement might address himself with some confidence to the attention of his own countrymen; he now speaks, not to his countrymen only, but to mankind. It may be said, proudly indeed, but it is believed justly, that on Great Britain at this moment chiefly rest all the hopes of returning happiness, independence, and security, among nations.

* The experience of the seven years which have elapsed since the first publication of this Pamphlet, has not induced the Author to regret his having expressed these opinions.

Britain

Britain is the bulwark that stands opposed to the flood which threatens to overwhelm the world. It must be therefore of the highest importance, to examine the foundation on which that bulwark rests. If, as we hope to shew, it is firmly established—if its strength is solid, and its security permanent—it should afford to other nations example* as well as consolation: it should point out to them an adoption of similar measures for similar purposes, and excite that energy and those

* A writer of eminent talents and considerable political knowledge, in No. 11. of the *Mercure Britannique* for Jan. 1799, has the following observation: “ L’Angleterre four-
 “ nit l’exemple de cette libéralité publique. L’Angleterre
 “ seule a saisi le danger et le préservatif. Là le gouverne-
 “ ment et la nation étroitement coalisés ont mis en commun
 “ leurs intérêts, leurs ressources, leur génie, et leur direction.
 “ Dix millions sterling forment le noble contingent dont ils
 “ ont fait l’offrande à la délivrance de l’Europe.

“ Que le continent assemble des congrès, députe des plé-
 “ nipotentiaires; qu’il se repose sur ses armes ou qu’il com-
 “ batte, son salut est un chimère, tant qu’il refusera d’in-
 “ téresser les peuples à de grands sacrifices personnels, tant
 “ qu’il s’effrayera de la dépense de sa conservation, plus que
 “ du péril dans lequel il est plongé.”

powers

powers of exertion, which alone can afford protection against the common danger, and repel the attacks of the Common Enemy.

Of the measures to which we are disposed to attribute consequences so beneficial, some were adopted during the period (ending in 1792) reviewed in the former Tract, to which we refer for particulars.* Those of most importance were, the funding the floating debt in 1784 and 1785; the imposing new taxes of such a kind as, while they were productive to the public treasury, did not affect the sources of national industry, or press on those classes of the community by whom that industry is supported; a vigilant attention to prevent frauds in the collection of the old revenue,

* The interest of the debt contracted in the American war, and funded at the end of it, was 4,864,000*l*. The increase of revenue, in the year ending Christmas 1784, (nine months after the peace) was 1,755,000*l*. above the year 1774; which left a deficiency of 3,108,000*l*. The floating debt, at the end of the war, was 27,000,000*l*. exclusive of loyalists' debentures.

and to make that collection simple and less expensive, more productive to the state, yet less embarrassing to the trader; to which we may add the merit of adopting some of those measures,* without fearing that transient unpopularity which ignorance or misrepresentation of their effects were ready to encourage.

Such were the means which the wisdom of the Parliament, of 1784, devised for the restoration of the credit, and the re-establishment of the finances, of Great Britain; while, at the same time, they were equally favourable to the extension of our commerce, and the encouragement of our manufactures. The effect produced was, that in 1792 the revenue was increased (exclusive of taxes to the extent of 800,000*l.* a year, imposed to defray the charges of the Spanish armament) upwards of 4,000,000*l.*—of which, something less than 1,000,000*l.* arose from new taxes

* Transferring the management of the duties on wine and tobacco to the Excise, &c.

and an increase derived from the consolidation of the customs.

But the measure which above all others tended to give credit and vigour to the country, was the appropriation, in 1786, of the annual million to the extinction of the national debt. This was calculated to give the firmest confidence in the stability of the national funds. The Act was guarded by every provision that could be devised to insure a fidelity in execution equal to the wisdom and extent of the design; and, in its detail, so contrived as regularly to afford to Parliament, and to the public, the clearest and most distinct view of its progressive operation.

The only important points of contention, respecting our finances within the period before examined, were, whether the services were all provided for, and whether a fair surplus existed for the payment of the sums appropriated for the reduction of the national

debt. It would be tedious and unprofitable to enter into the details of constant and repeated attacks on the part of Opposition, or of defence on the part of Administration, on that subject, because the mere repetition of a fact we stated at the end of that period will put the matter completely out of doubt.

“ Notwithstanding the many extraordinary
 “ expences which a concurrence of circum-
 “ stances produced during the last eight years,
 “ beyond the common charges of the peace
 “ establishment, no additions were made to
 “ the debt, except 1,000,000*l.* raised by a
 “ tontine in 1789, and navy bills funded to
 “ the amount of 458,000*l.*”

The taxes, including those repealed in 1792, amounted, in the year ending the 5th of January in that year, to 14,132,000*l.* And *8,200,000*l.* of the capital of the national

* From the establishment of the sinking fund in 1716, to the commencement of the war in 1741, the national debt was not reduced to the amount of 8,000,000*l.*

debt

debt had then been redeemed by the sinking fund, established in 1786.

In this situation our finances stood, on the commencement of hostilities. The following is the state of the old * revenue since that time, which can hardly be contemplated without some degree of wonder and exultation, when it is considered, that † new taxes have been imposed to the amount of more than 7,500,000*l.* a year; and that in the last year, nearly the most productive of the whole, a farther sum of about 7,000,000*l.* was raised by an aid and contribution, by voluntary subscriptions, and by the convoy tax.

* In this war, for the first time (under one of the wise provisions of the Consolidation Act) the accounts of the new taxes have been kept distinct from the old revenue; and these are annually laid before Parliament, to shew how far the taxes imposed are sufficient to pay the interest of the debt created, and to provide a sinking fund for the gradual extinction of it.

† In 1799.

Taxes imposed before 1792 :

In the year 1792, - - -	£.14,284,000
1793, - - -	13,941,000
1794, - - -	13,858,000
1795, - - -	£.13,338,000
Bounties paid for seamen, and for corn imported - -	219,000
	13,557,000
In the year 1796, - - -	13,187,000
Bounties as above; and loss on British spirits, by stoppage of distillery, computed on an average of three preceding years - - -	1,105,000
	14,292,000
In the year 1797, - - -	13,262,000
Bounties, - - -	70,000
	13,332,000
In the year 1798, - - -	14,275,000
1799, - - -	15,727,000
1800, - - -	14,194,000
Corn Bounties, - - -	44,000
	14,238,000
In the year 1801, - - -	13,221,000
Corn Bounties paid, - - -	1,420,000
	14,641,000
In the year 1802, - - -	14,718,000
Corn Bounties paid, - - -	715,000
	15,433,000

In the year 1803, the Duties of Customs, Excise, and Stamps, imposed before 1792, were consolidated with those imposed since that year; the amount of the old taxes cannot therefore be longer distinguished at the Exchequer.

We

We shall now proceed to shew the amount of money borrowed, capital created, and annual charge incurred, since the commencement of the war.

Amount of Money borrowed, Capital created and Annual Charge incurred, in the Years under-mentioned, on Account of Great Britain.

	Money borrowed.	Capital created.	Long Annuity.	Interest.	Manage- ment.	Sinking Fund.	Annual Charge.	Total Charge in each Year.
In 1793—Loan	4,500,000	6,250,000	...	187,500	2,812	62,500	252,812	252,812
1794—Ditto	11,000,000	13,750,000	62,791	440,000	6,893	147,180	656,865	773,324
Navy Bills, &c. funded	1,907,452	1,926,525	...	96,326	866	19,265	116,458	
1795—Loan	18,000,000	24,000,000	85,500	780,000	11,761	252,835	1,130,096	1,227,415
Navy Bills funded	1,490,647	1,609,897	...	80,494	724	16,098	97,318	
1796—Loan	18,000,000	26,095,800	58,500	782,874	12,401	269,418	1,123,193	1,850,373
Ditto	7,500,000	10,795,825	20,582	323,814	5,088	110,863	460,349	
Navy Bills funded	4,226,727	4,414,074	...	220,703	1,986	44,140	266,830	
1797—Loan	18,000,000	20,124,843	...	1,005,242	9,056	201,248	1,216,546	
Ditto part of 14,500,000 <i>l.</i>	13,000,000	25,350,000	39,000	786,500	11,846	258,859	1,096,205	3,241,790
Navy Bills funded	11,595,529	19,238,492	...	625,506	8,657	192,385	826,549	
Exchequer Bills ditto	1,433,870	2,374,333	...	77,678	1,068	23,743	102,490	
1798—Loan, part of 17,000,000 <i>l.</i>	7,000,000	14,000,000	17,208	420,000	6,493	142,240	585,942	1,093,029
Ditto 8,000,000 <i>l.</i> further part of ditto	8,000,000	16,000,000	19,616	480,000	7,421	...	*507,087	
1799—Loan 3,000,000 <i>l.</i>	4,500,000	8,242,250	...	247,477	3,712	82,492	333,682	919,844
Ditto 1,500,000 <i>l.</i> part of 15,500,000 <i>l.</i>	11,000,000	19,250,000	...	577,500	- 8,662	...	*586,162	
Ditto 11,000,000 <i>l.</i> further? part of ditto	5,000,000	7,850,080	...	235,500	3,532	78,500	317,532	962,920
1800—Loan 5,000,000 <i>l.</i> part of 20,500,000 <i>l.</i>	13,500,000	21,195,000	...	635,850	9,537	...	*645,388	
Ditto 13,500,000 <i>l.</i> further? part of ditto								

1801—Loan 25,500,000 <i>l.</i> part of 28,000,000 <i>l.</i>	25,500,000	44,816,250		1,344,487	20,167	448,162	1,812,817	1,812,817
1802—Exch ^r Bills funded and 50 per cent. thereon subscribed in money, making together Loan 23,000,000 <i>l.</i> part of 25,000,000 <i>l.</i>	8910450 23000000 }	11,138,062 28,750,000 1,601,375	7,796	423,246 862,500	5,099 12,937 729	112,222	548,365 875,437 + 720	1,424,523
1803—Loan 10,000,000 <i>l.</i> part of 12,000,000 <i>l.</i>	10,000,000	16,000,000	32,083	480,000	7,560	163,137	682,782	682,782
1804—Loan 10,000,000 <i>l.</i> part of 14,500,000 <i>l.</i>	10,000,000	18,200,000		546,000	8,190	182,000	736,190	846,085
2,716,814 <i>l.</i> 3 per cent. Reduced Ann. created by 13,263,533 <i>l.</i> subscribed into 5 per cent. Consolidated Ann. from 5 per cents. 1797 and 1802.		2,716,814		81,504	1,222	27,168	109,895	
1805—Loan 20,000,000 <i>l.</i> part of 22,500,000 <i>l.</i>	20,000,000	34,400,000		1,032,000	15,480	344,000	1,391,480	1,443,962
Increased capital created on 5,703,513 <i>l.</i> 5 per cents. 1797, paid off or subscribed into other Funds		2,426,311		27,127	1,091	24,263	52,482	
1806—Loan 18,000,000 <i>l.</i> part of 20,000,000 <i>l.</i>	18,000,000	29,880,000		896,400	13,446	298,800	1,208,646	1,208,646
	275,064,675	432,393,851	343,126	13,697,228	198,427	3,501,518		17,740,322

* These sums were originally charged upon the duties on Income, but by Act 42 Geo. 3, were added to the permanent debt, and the interest and management charged on the Consolidated Fund.

† The interest on this capital is not to commence till Jan. 5, 1808.

We are naturally led next to examine, how the Taxes imposed during the War, meet this increased Charge.

They amounted, in the year ended the 5th of January, 1799, to 6,774,458*l*.

When this Pamphlet was published, in that year the further produce of these Taxes was estimated at 908,000*l*. making a total of 7,682,000*l*.; but in the Accompt laid before Parliament in 1804, the actual produce thereof was 7,843,000*l*. to meet the charge incurred of 7,931,000*l*.

If we look to a later period, the view will be still more consolatory, as it appears by the same Accompt laid in 1804, that the charge incurred to 1803, inclusive, was 13,998,000*l*. and the actual produce of the new Taxes, in the year to January 1804, was 15,433,000*l*. affording a surplus of 1,435,000*l*. of income beyond the charge; a very large proportion of the latter was for the Sinking Fund, to redeem the debt incurred in each year.

Exclusive of the specific Provision made in consequence of the Debt incurred since the War, there is an increase on the Old Taxes, since they were stated by the Committee of 1791 to be adequate to the Peace Establishment, as under:

In 1802, the latest year for which the produce of the Taxes imposed before 1793 can be ascertained, the	
Produce of the Old Taxes was - - - -	£.15,433,000
Estimate of the Committee in 1791, on an	} 13,472,000
Average of three Years - - - - -	
Surplus of the Taxes - - - - -	<u>£.1,961,000</u>

In the whole of these statements of the Public Income there are no points subject to the smallest doubt.

On the other side of the account, the only article to be added is, the interest of exchequer bills to the amount of 1,000,000*l.* issued beyond what was included in the estimate of 16,000,000*l.* for the peace establishment ;* except

* In an introduction to the Seventh Edition of this Pamphlet, in 1799, the addition to the Peace Establishment beyond the estimate of the committee in 1791 for expences then foreseen, arising from increase of pay to the army, navy, barracks, increase of Navy debt, interest of Exchequer bills, &c. was estimated at 1,260,000*l.* The increase of the pay of the navy and army in this session amounting to about 800,000*l.* (that of the latter being principally for the regular forces) will add considerably to the Peace Establishment ; but the expence which must inevitably be incurred by the new system of recruiting, with its consequences, will add to it much

except the charge incurred by the two Imperial loans shall be ultimately fixed on this country, contrary to good faith, in which case there will be a necessity of providing to the extent of 497,000*l.* a year more.

On the same principle that guided the determination of the Parliament of 1786, another Act was passed, in 1792, which provided that on all future loans (in addition to the taxes to be imposed for paying the interest of the same) a surplus of 1*l.* per cent. per annum, on the capital created, should be raised for the redemption of that capital. This was an idea conceived in that spirit of inflexible integrity and economy, of which nations rarely afford an example; though, like the

more largely, to an extent indeed very difficult to make an accurate estimate of now.

Whatever the whole may be, we have,

Surplus of old taxes, before 1792, as above	£.1,961,000
Surplus of taxes imposed since 1792, beyond the charge incurred	} 1,455,000
Annual Profit on Land Tax redeemed, about	70,000
	£.3,486,000
	same

same virtue in private life, it is calculated to promote, in the highest degree, their credit and their prosperity.

We are more than ordinarily anxious to call the attention of the public to this last measure, convinced as we are that it is of the utmost importance to the stability of British credit. It is impossible to view it in any light, in which this will not appear obvious and striking. The fears of the most timid, and the doubts of the most incredulous, will vanish, if the certain and infallible effects of it are attentively considered. Every debt is now reduced to an annuity, determinable at a period more or less distant according to the price of stocks in the interval of its operation; which annuity, a large proportion of the persons in existence at the time of the debt being created, must, in the ordinary course of nature, live to see the end of. With every additional burden which might be supposed to weaken the security of the public creditor,

creditor, is thus interwoven a provision for establishing it, by confining within certain limits the extent to which any debt can be accumulated, and ascertaining the redemption of the whole debt, whatever may be its amount, within a given period from its creation.

In attributing merit to the adoption of such measures, we must not lose sight of the *firm adherence* to them under circumstances of the greatest difficulty. One of the chief arguments used to depreciate the advantage expected from the plan of the annual million, on the first proposal of it in 1786, was, the uncertainty of its duration; it was urged, that in the first hour of necessity this sinking fund (as had happened to other sinking funds) would be applied, by the minister of the time, to the exigency which might immediately press upon him : every precaution, as before observed, was, however, taken to prevent this. But we have now something more
than

than a trust in legislative regulation and restriction for our confidence in the stability of the measure, however safely we might have relied on these. We have already seen times as trying to the resources of the country as the warmest opponent of the mode of attaining the object foreboded; we have seen a war, in which the most vigorous, the most extensive, and the most rapid exertions, were necessary to the immediate safety and preservation of the Empire; we have seen this war unavoidably protracted, by the overbearing insolence and the extravagant pretensions of the enemy, and enlarged in its objects beyond any former contest in which this country had ever been engaged;—the expence has been proportionate; but, in a contest in which every thing valuable is at stake, we were to grapple with the necessity at any expence. Yet the means for sustaining it have been provided, without trenching in the smallest degree upon this fund allotted for the extinction

tion of the national debt, * and with an inflexible perseverance in the measure of providing

* This sacred adherence to a strict application of the sinking fund, is very different from the practice of former times. We alluded generally, in our last Publication,† to the one established in 1716 having been frequently diverted soon after its creation; since which, we have met with a pamphlet written by a confidential friend of Sir Robert Walpole, in the year 1735, in defence of that minister, against a violent attack made upon him by the united abilities of the three most able writers in opposition at that time, in which are the following passages.

“ That the application of the sinking fund should, in general, go to the discharge of the old national debt, is just
 “ and prudent; and that it ought not to be diverted to any
 “ other use, but when public utility and the interest of the
 “ nation require it, has never been disputed: but that it may
 “ *sometimes* and *occasionally* be made use of, by authority of
 “ Parliament, when the exigency of the public makes it necessary, is what, I think, is most evident.”

“ From what has been said, I think I may very justly conclude, that the public has the sole interest in the sinking fund; that the applying the produce of it to the discharge of the old national debt, is an appropriation that ought to be looked upon as obligatory, and not to be dispensed with or postponed, but when the manifest interest and utility of
 “ the

† Princed in 1792.

viding in every new loan a surplus for the redemption of it.

“ the public shall require it. In which case it is most manifest, that such a temporary use of any part of the sinking fund is no breach of public faith ; no invasion of any right or property which the creditors have, in their own right, to receive it ; and that there is *no contract, condition, or agreement, whatsoever, between the public and the proprietors of the public funds*, that can justify or support any such claim or demand.”

The restrictive words, in the statute for appropriating the surplus, are however, as strong as could well have been found : “ to and for none other use, intent, or purpose, whatsoever.” We could refer to the Journals for a variety of instances in which the sinking fund was diverted ; but it will be less tiresome to our readers, to look into the Life of Sir Robert Walpole, published last year—p. 366 to 372—509—634—666.—The new minister, who exclaimed most against the alienation in Sir Robert Walpole’s time, followed his example, p. 707.

A Statement of the Income arising from the Old and New Sinking Funds on the 1st of May, 1806.

	£.	s.	d.
Annual Million, 26 Geo. 3. £.1,000,000	0	0	
Annual additional Issue from } 1792, perpetuated by 42 Geo. 3. }	200,000	0	0
Annuities 99 and 96, expired .	54,880	14	6
Annuities 1777; . . . ditto	25,000	0	0
Unclaimed and Expired An- } nuities on Lives }	50,308	5	7
Annual Interest on 56,317,489 <i>l</i> . } the Capital redeemed May 1, } 1806, at 3 per ct. . . . }	1,689,524	13	4
Ditto on 2,617,400 <i>l</i> . at 4 per ct.	104,696	0	0
Ditto on 142,000 <i>l</i> . at 5 per ct.	7,100	0	0
Old Sinking Fund	3,131,509	13	5
One per cent. per Annum on ac- } count of Loans raised from } 1793 to 1806, both inclusive }	3,494,541	6	6
Annual Interest on 44,989,533 <i>l</i> . } the Capital redeemed May 1, } 1806, at 3 per cent. . . . }	1,349,685	19	9
New Sinking Fund	4,844,227	6	3
	£7,975,736	19	8

IMPERIAL.

One per cent. per Annum on ac- } count of Loan 1797 . . . }	36,693	0	0
Annual Interest on 673,126 <i>l</i> . the } Capital redeemed May 1, 1806, } at 3 per cent. }	20,193	15	7
	56,886	15	7
Total	£8,032,623	15	3
	Exclusive		

Capital paid off by Old Sinking Fund	}	59,076,000	0	0
Imperial		673,000	0	0
		59,749,000	0	0
Ditto by New Sinking Fund		44,989,000	0	0
		104,738,000	0	0
Expence of Spanish Armament in 1791, by } Debentures paid off	}	3,133,000	0	0
Debent. granted to Loyalists in America, paid off		2,946,000	0	0
		110,817,000	0	0
Deduct Debt created by Tontine in 1789, and } Navy Bills funded	}	1,458,000	0	0
		<u>£109,359,000</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>

By the operation of these sinking funds, without any farther intervention of Parliament, the one existing before the war, will attain its maximum (4,000,000*l.* a year) most probably in 1808, in no case later than February 1811; and supposing the 3 per cents. to be on an average at 85*l.* which is perhaps the fairest medium to take, considering the probable rapid rise of the funds, on a return of peace, from the immense purchases which

will then be made, from the accumulation of the sinking fund; and how little the average is likely to be effected by the low price in the early part of the period, the capital of the Old Debt, which was about 240,000,000*l*. will be completely redeemed in January, 1846: if the same price of the 3 per cents. is assumed, in computing the period of redemption of the New Debt created since the war, the 3 per cents. will be redeemed in less than 39 years and a half, from the time of making each loan. At the *present* * price, 53½, the 3 per cents. created by new loans, would be redeemed in 23 years and a quarter, from the time each was made.†

As the dividends due on such parts of the

* In the year 1799.

† For the proof of these statements and the periods within which the Old and New Debt will be paid off, according to the different prices at which the stocks may be, see Appendix, No. 2 and No. 3.

Old Debt as shall be paid off after the sinking fund shall have attained its maximum, and the annuities which shall afterwards fall in, will be at the disposal of Parliament; the period of repealing taxes annually, to an amount equal thereto, cannot be delayed more than 9, 10, or 11 years.*

Notwithstanding these provisions for the gradual and speedy relief of the kingdom from the burdens unavoidably imposed upon it, the funds, by the accumulation of new loans, were brought to a state of depression which made it expedient to raise a considerable proportion of the war supply within the year; the wisdom of the legislature, and the spirit of the people, instantly combined in a vigorous effort for this purpose; thus not only opposing to the enemy the most animated exertions for our own security, but looking with disinterested

* From 1799 : See Appendix, No. 2.

magnanimity to the ease and happiness of posterity:

“ Attollens humero famamque et fata nepotum.”

When the means of carrying into effect this plan was under deliberation in the last year, a tax on capital appeared to be utterly impracticable; it was demonstrated in the debate in the House of Commons, that the assistance of a lawyer and a mathematician would have been necessary in almost every case of real, and in many of personal, property; and, if that difficulty could have been got over, that the whole of the interests in reversionary estates (probably in value more than half the landed property in the kingdom) must of necessity have escaped; in other instances the grossest inequalities must have occurred. A direct tax on Income was next adverted to; but it was then thought liable to many objections. Recourse was therefore had to the measure of a charge varying according to the amount of the As-

3 sessed

essed Taxes, paid by persons in different situations, as likely to afford, though not a certain, yet a tolerably fair criterion of the income of individuals, to which their expenditure was supposed in general to be proportioned.

Under this mode, the produce was nearly as considerable as the calculation stated in the House of Commons; and it was more owing to the evasions practised to escape the tax, than to the inefficacy of its principle, that it was not more so; yet the Voluntary Contributions of individuals poured into the public coffers by all ranks and conditions in the country, vying with each other, abundantly compensated for the deficiency;—the sovereign and the royal family giving very large proportions of their disposeable income; the nobility, gentry, clergy, merchants, manufacturers, yeomanry, domestics, and peasantry, coming forward with liberality and cheerfulness; and even the gallant seamen,
soldiers,

soldiers, and militia, in addition to their personal services for the national defence, contributed also largely to it from their pay. The sum produced by the Assessment and the Contribution amounted in the whole to somewhat more than 6,000,000l.*

The inequality, however, of the assessment (exclusive of that occasioned by evasion) and still more of the Contribution, was evident; but the principle of raising a large part of the supply within the year was established, and a measure was effected, which had been frequently contemplated, by theorists in political economy, with all that partiality to which its effects, in various points of view, seemed reasonably to entitle it; but they had scarcely ventured to hope for its actual adoption in a country already burdened so heavily as ours, where it might be supposed fatal to

* There was hardly a spot on the globe in which a British subject was resident from whence there were not remittances.

the popularity of the minister who should propose it, and adverse to the immediate interests of the people whom it was to affect. It *has been* adopted however, still more effectually in the present session, by the tax on Income, and it is no less flattering to the national pride, than it is promising to the national security and welfare, to consider that the good sense, the foresight, and the resolution of the people have kept pace with, and in some degree anticipated, the idea of government on the subject. The principle, the general proposition, was recommended by the country.* The question of the best mode of

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carrying

* The great body of merchants, bankers, and traders, in the capital, assembled at the Mansion-house, and with unanimity set the example. A passage from the resolutions, which were also unanimously agreed to, at Liverpool, is strongly expressive of the public opinion and feeling on the subject: "Actuated by a conviction that the resources of the Nation are adequate to the maintenance of its rights, and the vindication of its honour, we think it our duty to avow our readiness to support such expedients as the wisdom of the legislature may devise for calling those resources fully
"and

carrying it into effect, was left for the wisdom of Parliament, where it was discussed, matured, and completed.

This plan has been resorted to, as more equal and more efficacious than the former. It may be thought presumptuous to speak at present of its effects; it certainly underwent such full consideration and discussion as may be supposed to give it a fair chance for all the advantages which prospective wisdom can afford to any public measure. Apprehensions, it is true, have been expressed, that the produce of the permanent taxes may be affected by a large sum being raised within the year; it must, however, afford great consolation to

“ and fairly into action; not doubting, that such a demonstration of energy and firmness will impress the enemy with
 “ a more correct idea of our extensive power; and hoping,
 “ by a display of so substantial a proof that the vigour of
 “ our resistance still keeps pace with their desolating schemes
 “ of conquest, it may lead, under the blessing of God, to
 “ the ultimate end of all our exertions,—a safe, a lasting, and
 “ an honourable peace.”

those

those who really entertain such fears, to see it ascertained, that, in the last year, when nearly seven millions were so raised, the old taxes existing before the war were almost a million higher than in the year preceding.*

It seems reasonable, therefore, to hope that at least there will be no material diminution of the produce of the permanent taxes.

In contemplating the amount of the public revenue, there is something more than the mere consideration of the sum paid into the Exchequer. The revenue is not only the produce, but, in a certain degree, the criterion of national wealth; especially, as much of it is raised on articles not of necessity but of convenience, and even luxury; which shews, in a most satisfactory manner, as well what the people enjoy as what they contri-

* In the year ending the 5th of January, 1803, (since which no separate account is kept of these taxes) the average of four years of the old taxes, existing before the war, was 2,155,000*l.* higher than the average of the seven years to 1792.

bute. On examination it will be found, that the increase of late years has arisen as much upon such articles as on any others of which the revenue is composed.

It is a principle of taxation, equally permanent and politic, to spare, as far as is consistent with the productiveness of the taxes to be imposed, the great body of the people; those inferior ranks from whose labour and industry the wealth of the country is chiefly derived. This has been in a particular manner the ruling principle of the ways-and-means of late years, insomuch that it has been frequently doubted by men most conversant in subjects of finance, whether the objects of taxation selected, were broad and general enough to bring up their produce to the necessary or calculated amount.—It is gratifying however, to our feelings, to perceive that the taxes imposed for some years past, avoiding as they have done, as much as possible to affect the comforts of the inferior classes of the community.

munity, have not failed in being amply productive.

This principle, of proportioning public assessments to the ability of different classes, has been particularly attended to in the great measure for raising 10 per cent. on income. The small earnings of laborious industry are spared altogether; the progressive rise of the tax saves, in a proportional degree, the moderate incomes of the classes of all the orders below competency; and the burden of children, which always falls heaviest on the middling ranks, is considered in an abatement on the contribution of their parents, with reference both to the number of children and to the income of the persons maintaining them.*

The

* Mr. Pitt saw the advantage that would be derived to the public from raising a large sum within the year towards the annual supply, and determined upon the measure, though attended with difficulties thought by many insuperable: It was at first attempted, as has been shewn, by a charge on persons in proportion to the Assessed Taxes, for reasons then
to

The idea of carrying the progressive rise of the tax beyond certain considerable amounts of yearly income, was urged in the debates on the Bill, with arguments of some plausibility.—But it should always be considered, that the excessive rise of a progression of this sort is, in effect, an arbitrary levelling of situations acquired by honourable service, by useful talents, and by meritorious industry; and, that, in a country of so much productive labour as ours, an inordinate tax on the wealthy, suddenly imposed, would take from the lower classes, whom the superfluity of wealth employs, that subsistence and comfort which are bestowed by it.

On the ground of economy, it is evident, that at the rate of interest at which we must have borrowed, in the state the funds were, an annual sum, nearly equal to one-twelfth

stated; and afterwards by a tax on Income: That was improved in Mr. Addington's administration, by what is now called the Property tax; which at 5 per cent., produced, in the year 1805, very little short of 4,500,000*l*. when the charge on the Income Tax stated in the next page was provided for,

part

part of the principal, would have been necessary for defraying the interest and furnishing the requisite sinking fund. In the way now adopted, no interest can be wanted for the first ten millions raised within the year. For the remaining ten millions, a charge of about 6 per cent. for interest will be incurred, till a capital, equal to what may be created by a loan to that amount, shall be redeemed by this temporary tax after the war; which may be one, two, three, or more years, according to the continuance of the war. The limit, therefore, is 600,000*l.* a year, till such capital shall be redeemed; and if we were even to suppose four years to elapse before that happens, the whole sum ultimately paid by the public would be 22,400,000*l.* *—According to the other mode, supposing the capital of the new debt to be extinguished in thirty-nine years and a half, (the 3 per cents. on an average at 85*l.*),† more than 63,000,000*l.* would be

* See the note at the bottom of the preceding page.

† See Appendix No. 3.

paid by the country. It is evident, therefore, that the saving is nearly in a threefold proportion, without taking into the account the difference in favour of a direct contribution, compared with taxes on consumption.

During the session of 1798, another measure was adopted for raising, during the war, a considerable sum within the year, of sufficient importance to be noticed here, both as a regulation of public policy and an expedient of finance; we mean the Convoy-Tax, a small per centage on the value of goods exported and imported, with some exceptions, and a small tonnage duty on all ships arriving at, or sailing from, any port in Great Britain. Our superiority at sea was decided, and complete protection had been afforded to every branch of our trade by convoys, to the perfect satisfaction of the merchants; but their adventurous spirit induced them frequently to send their ships to various parts of the world for an early market, without waiting

ing for protection, from whence it too often happened that valuable cargoes were captured; and, what was of more importance, a number of British seamen were shut up and rigourously treated in the gaols of our implacable enemy; a restraint was therefore imposed on that practice in future, unless licences should be obtained from the Admiralty. The cheerfulness with which this was acquiesced in by the merchants and manufacturers, exhibited another instance of their zeal and public spirit; for, although in some cases the tax is less than the insurance saved by its operation, a small advance of capital became necessary, and it was impossible entirely to avoid all inconveniences respecting the shipping the goods.

As a measure of public policy, accompanied as it is with the regulation above alluded to, it has the effect at once of giving safety to our trade, by protecting it from the depredations of the enemy (almost the

only species of warfare left to their exertions), and of depriving them of resources to an immense amount, which they derived from the prizes carried into their ports. As a measure of revenue, it combines ease of collection with security from fraud, arising from the smallness of the duty, compared with the value of the merchandize on which it is levied. In almost every case where it was conceived it could be felt as a burthen, exceptions were admitted.

During the short time since the tax took place, in July 1798, its produce has been such as to afford a most satisfactory proof (in addition to others in the following pages) of the highly prosperous situation of the commerce and navigation of the country. The money paid to the Customs, in the half year ending January 5, 1799, amounts to 639,000*l*.* which

* In this sum are not included either the duties due by the East-India Company on their imports (which are not paid till after

which is considerably under the actual produce of the period. In a commercial view, it has also been attended with the very advantageous effect of ascertaining (contrary to incessant declamations on the subject) that the real value of our exports exceeds, in the proportion of at least 70 per cent., the former estimates of them.

The circumstances mentioned in some of the preceding pages, are not equivocal symptoms of national prosperity. We can, however, look with increased confidence to more direct evidence of its advancement.* We can most incontrovertibly

after their sales), or the duties which are bonded by the exporters:—and the largest West-India fleet of the year arrived a few days before the Act took place, the whole property in which escaped the tax. The temporary duties on goods and shipping amounted, in the year 1805, to 2,395,000*l*.

See the opposite table 43.*

* It must afford the highest encouragement and gratification to have it ascertained, that, within the same period in which our permanent taxes are more than trebled, the exports of our manufactures have nearly kept pace with that increase.

trovertibly prove that, under the pressure of new burthens, and during the continuance of the eventful contest in which we are engaged, the revenue, the manufactures, and the commerce of the country have flourished beyond the example of all former times. The war, which has crushed the industry, and annihilated the trade and shipping * of her rival, has given energy and extent to those of Great Britain.

The subject of French oppression is now become as trite to reflection as disgusting to humanity ; but it is impossible to advert to the topics of the present estimate without be

Taxes in 1783	£.10,194,259
Permanent Taxes in 1805	32,083,000
British Manufactures, according to Custom-	
House valuation, exported in 1783 . .	10,314,000
Ditto in 1805 . .	25,003,000

* In a message from the Directory, 14th of January 1799, to the Council of Five Hundred, they declare, “ it is unhappily too true, that there is not a single merchantman trading “ under French Colours.”

ing

ing struck with the difference between France and Great Britain ; first in the amount of revenue compared with expenditure ; and, secondly, in the sources from which that revenue is drawn. Great Britain, as the annexed tables will shew, draws her means for carrying on the war, from the increasing manufactures and trade of her people, and from a commercial intercourse, beneficial to foreign countries, at the same time that it adds to the wealth and prosperity of their own. France wrings her supplies from taxes on her own inhabitants infinitely more oppressive than those under the monarchy,—from requisitions on her friends and allies, from the pillage and rapine inflicted on the unfortunate countries she has overrun, and from withdrawing the small pittance allowed to the hospitals in lieu of their estates which she had confiscated and sold.—Great Britain, while she pays the interest of her funded debt at the hour it is due, provides, from the surplus

plus of the taxes levied to answer that interest, a fund which in a certain period positively secures the discharge of the principal of that debt.—France, while she withholds the interest of her debt, even of that third which she declared national, is forced from time to time to confess enormous deficits in her annual revenue below the amount of her annual expenditure.*

Great

* The Directory announced, *in distinct terms*, in a message to the two Councils, on the 2d of February 1799, “ That their
 “ whole receipt did not exceed 1,000,000 livres a day (about
 “ 15,000,000*l.* sterling a year) ;—that the means of paying
 “ the army could no longer be depended upon ;—that no
 “ provision could be made for the navy ;—that other payments
 “ of a most urgent nature were suspended ;—that the public
 “ credit was daily declining, which necessarily affected
 “ that of individuals ;—that their expences were increasing ;
 “ —and that the service, which was before cramped, was
 “ exposed to an immediate and fatal catastrophe :” which facts they stated as incontrovertible. This total receipt of 15,000,000*l.* sterling a year, is not made up solely from the revenue of France, but, includes the sale of the national property, the fall of timber in the forests, the plunder of their armies from other nations brought into the Treasury at
 Paris,

Great Britain now raising within the year, by war-taxes, a large proportion of the whole of the supplies, looks with an honest confidence on the industry, energy, and spirit, of her people, for her continued ability to meet future exigencies with adequate resources. If we could hazard a prediction in times so extraordinary, we should say, that the tyranny of France must necessarily exhaust the channels of her extorted treasure; for pillage and rapine lay waste the soil, instead of reaping the present or

Paris, the income from national property confiscated but not sold, &c. &c. &c. — The nett revenue of France in the year 1797 was under 8,400,000*l.* sterling.

Whoever will be at the trouble of considering the last *comptes rendus* by the Treasury,* and the reports of the commissions of Finance, will be convinced that the *taxes* paid by the people of France, and of the new departments, amount to little more than a third of the revenue under the monarchy, although the people feel that they are taxed in at least a threefold proportion, compared with their means of paying, to what they were before the revolution. Complaints, and refusals to pay the taxes, are met with throughout the country.

* In the year 1799.

providing for future harvests. This is on the supposition of the extent of her dominion remaining undiminished; nothing is allowed in the calculation, for the resistance of oppressed, or for the despair of ruined provinces; such estimates are not within the scope of our enquiry.*

The enthusiasm of France has often been mentioned as one of the sources from which the most strenuous exertions, both of personal service and of pecuniary contribution to the state, might be expected. The lust of rapine has indeed given ardour to her armies, but the produce of French patriotism, from the citizens at home, has not manifested much

* It is a singular coincidence, that in the *Moniteur* of the 8th of February 1799, in which the message from the Directory is inserted, stating the distracted state of their finances, there is also published the rescript to the Emperor, announcing their intention of recommencing the war in a fortnight, if he should not comply with their mandate respecting the Russian troops: resorting thus to their usual means of providing for their armies in neighbouring countries, when they can no longer subsist them in their own.

zeal in the cause, or much confidence in the credit of the Republic. The amount of the voluntary contributions in France, to support the expensive preparations for the invasion of this country, in 1797 and 1798, amounted to 273,607 livres;—a trifle more than the free gift of an English manufacturer* to the Voluntary Contribution of last year, whose single subscription, in one payment at the Bank of England, was 10,000*l*.

In personal services the comparison is not less favourable to Great Britain than in pecuniary contributions. The numerous associations of volunteer corps, under the act of 1794, in every part of the kingdom, as the threats of invasion increased, outweigh in numbers, and much more in proof of zeal for the public cause, the forced enrollments of the enemy.

* We feel infinite satisfaction in publishing to the world the name of Robert Peele, Esq. of Bury, Lancashire, who thus exalted the national character.

In the sudden and urgent preparations for national defence, it is not easy to pause on the consideration of expence; but the institution of armed bodies of *yeomanry*, almost universal through Great Britain, had an obvious advantage, even in point of economy, as it provided a complete defence against the threatened invasion of the enemy, while it afforded an opportunity to our brave and gallant militia to assist our sister-kingdom in the suppression of an unnatural rebellion, and for the employment of the army wherever it might be wanted. This rampart was raised around the country, by the patriotism and courage of the people, called forth by the executive government; and it holds out not only an assurance of present safety, but of permanent protection for the future.

We have thus far endeavoured to fix the attention of our readers on the exertions of the legislature, for raising supplies, great beyond all example, and on the spirit and good sense of
of

of the people, under the circumstances of a war the most expensive, as well as the most perilous, in which we were ever engaged.* Our next object will be to shew that the money, granted with so much cheerfulness and liberality, has not only been brought into the public treasury at the least possible charge, but has been accompanied with the appointment of as few officers as the nature of circumstances would admit. The taxes imposed, during the war, are under the management of the several departments, as under :

* If the increased price of every article for the supply of the navy, and the addition that has been made to the pay of the army and navy, are adverted to, it will be found that as strict an economy has been used, in the present war, as ever was practised.

	Amount of Taxes.	Charges of Management.	Number of Officers appointed since 1792.	Offices discontinued since 1792.	Salaries diminished since 1792.
	£.	£.			£.
Customs - - - -	1,503,684	105	- -	- -	- -
Excise - - - -	2,846,466	- -	- -	45	2359
Stamps - - - -	1,099,232	3275	36	6	420
Taxes - - - -	1,069,512	3225	16	2	1000
Post-Office - - -	255,444	350	- -	- -	- -
Farther expected Produce	908,000				
	7,682,000	6955	52	*53	3779
		3779			

£.3176

Which is about † 10*d.* in the 100*l.* or $\frac{1}{2400}$ per cent. as a charge of collection on the duties.

In addition to the above, there is a charge of 6½*d.* in the pound on the management of what is collected under the commissioners for taxes; of which, the receiver-general has

* Besides these, there have been eighty-five sinecure places in the Customs abolished.—See page 54. From the very great augmentations made to each of these branches of Revenue since 1799, and the trifling addition of officers, the charges of collection must be much less now than they were then.

† The rate of collecting the new Duties must be very considerably less now, from the great additions to them, and the trifling increase of Officers.

2*d.*

2*d.* in the pound (hardly sufficient in many counties to pay his extra expences) and the parochial collectors and clerks the remaining 4*d.*

Of the stamp-revenue, about two-thirds is received at the head office in London; on the remaining one-third the distributors in the country receive a poundage; but the increase of their receipts has admitted of so considerable a reduction in the rate of that, as to occasion no charge to the public in collecting the new duties.

In the Excise, there are 198 new officers for the management of the salt-duties, with salaries amounting to 12,333*l.*; but, by the abolition of the whole salt department, 459 officers are reduced, with salaries (exclusive of considerable emoluments to the collectors, &c.) amounting to 26,952*l.**

* There are now 747 fewer persons, for the management of a revenue of 12,100,000*l.* a year, than there were, when the present Minister came into office, for a revenue of 6,000,000*l.*

The Excise Revenue in 1805, is become (including the War Taxes) 24,239,000*l.*

In

In the Customs, 85 offices have been abolished which were absolute sinecures, in value from under 100*l.* to 2000*l.* a year:—the minister has, indeed, uniformly acted upon this system of abolition since he came into office; as he declined filling up the vacancies which happened from 1784 to the present time; except in two instances, which, if explained, would be admitted as proper exceptions to the rule.

This statement requires little comment; it can hardly fail to prevent a repetition of the charge so often made, of the enormous expences attending the collection of taxes imposed. The expence of collecting the revenue of the Kingdom, including all the establishments, was stated by the Committee of Finance, in 1797, to be on the gross receipt—

	£.	s.	d.	
Customs	-	-	6 2	6 per cent.
Excise	-	-	4 12	1
Stamps	-	-	4 17	7
Taxes	-	-	3 12	5

In

In the Post-Office, a large part of the expence incurred is for the conveyance of letters by land and sea.

On the whole revenue as it is increased since that time, and under the change of management of a part of it, it is reduced in 1805 as under :

	£.	s.	d.
Customs - -	5	4	7
Excise - -	3	0	7
Stamps - -	3	5	0

In the taxes there is hardly any variation, as the poundage is uniform.

To these charges nothing is to be added for defalcations by remittances, or for failure of collectors, receivers, &c. &c. &c. as there have not been losses, in the public revenue, to the amount of more than 900*l*.* in the whole, from these or other causes during some years past.

* This sum has been lost chiefly by letter-carriers, &c.

If

If we then proceed to trace the application of the sums thus granted to all the various branches of the public service, we shall find the most economical management has been practised, and that the most effectual regulations have been adopted to prevent abuses.

We will begin with the navy.—From the commencement of the reign of Charles II. (prior to which there are no books extant) payments for stores for navy and victualling and for hire of transports, were made in bills payable at uncertain periods, the discount on which increased very considerably in the course of each war, without a remedy having been applied. It was in the present war that, for the first time, an attempt was made to prevent the same waste of the public money. An act was passed, early in 1794, to ascertain the payment of all bills issued for the service of the navy, &c. at the expiration of fifteen months from the date. This for some time produced the desired effect, as the discount was

was inconsiderable till the beginning of 1796; but as it rose gradually in that year to more than 14 per cent. it was found necessary to provide means for enabling the Naval Boards to pay in money on the 1st of November in that year, which they continued to do till the end of the next month: from that time, all payments have, by a law then passed, been made in bills at ninety days; these are considered as ready-money, and from hence a saving to the public has arisen, to the extent of the discounts formerly allowed by the Naval Boards for all their purchases, &c. which, in the five last years of the preceding war, was from $11\frac{1}{2}$ to $16\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.*

This measure did not, however, sufficiently relieve the money-market, which continued to feel the pressure of the navy bills previously issued and still circulating. Parliament was therefore induced, in the midst of

* See Appendix, No. 6. The Non-Interest-Bills were sometimes at a discount of 20 per cent.

pecuniary difficulties, to fund the whole, to the amount of more than eleven millions and a half, and nearly one million and a half in exchequer bills. A second loan was also made in May 1797, for 14,500,000*l.* (for the purpose, principally, of satisfying outstanding demands) in addition to the loan of 18,000,000*l.* which had been negotiated early in the same session.

The advantage of withdrawing from circulation government securities, to so large an amount, was experienced in various ways; the beneficial effects produced to the commerce of the country were as immediate as to its finance:—nearly the whole sum, which had been employed in navy bills, &c. was turned into active capital. Persons who had been in the habit, while the discounts on floating securities were high, of employing their money in that manner, returned to their dealings in discounting bills of exchange; and the stock thus created was diffused

fused among holders in every part of the kingdom.*

These efforts produced the desired effect of avoiding the inconvenience attending a large floating debt. But in order to the complete attainment of the object, of preventing any debt being incurred for the navy in future, the practice which had prevailed ever since the middle of the last century, with trifling deviations in King William's time, of voting 4*l.* a man per month, to cover the ordinary services of the navy (without regard to the increasing price of all articles in the course of one hundred and fifty years), was departed from in the beginning of 1798; a calculation was then, for the first time, made of what would cover the actual charge, exclusive of ordinary buildings and repairs; and a sum equal to 7*l.* a man per month was voted: the consequence of which has been, that the

* Exchequer Bills, which, at the end of August 1796, were at a discount of $10\frac{1}{8}$ per cent. were, in February 1799, at a premium of $\frac{1}{8}$. From that time to the present (July 1806) the fluctuation has been inconsiderable.

actual expence of the year 1798 was less than the money provided, of which there has been no instance since the peace of Utrecht ; and the navy-debt, on the 31st of December last, was 902,000*l.* less than in the year * preceding. An adherence to this practice, with the care now taken to vote previously sums sufficient to cover the extraordinaries of the army, and all other services that can be foreseen, must obviously protect us completely against a large floating debt at the end of the war.

The army expences come next under consideration. In former wars, it had been an invariable practice for the forces, on foreign service, to be furnished by contracts given to friends of government, and undoubtedly considered as beneficial ; the agents for whom were competitors in the market with each other, as well as with the commissioners for victualling, who bought the same articles for

* The navy-debt, on the 31st of December, 1805, was 5,911,000*l.* about 80,000*l.* less than in 1799.

the navy; the public, therefore, sustained a double loss, and the minister acquired considerable influence. This has been entirely avoided from the commencement of the war in 1793, the whole of the provisions having been purchased by the commissioners of victualling, as well for the land-forces abroad as for the fleets; and the stores of all other sorts have been provided either by the Navy or Transport Boards.*

The military expences, actually defrayed abroad, are of all others the most difficult to limit;—these have, however, been guarded with the utmost care and caution. The commanders-in-chief have been relieved from the painful situation of being public accountants, but are enabled, by distinct instructions, to exercise a general superintendance for the prevention of abuses. No purchases have

* Sums are now to be traced to the amount of more than 17,000,000*l.* paid to individuals in the American war; of which 12,700,000*l.* was for business on which a commission was paid to the parties of 190,000*l.*; the remainder was for beneficial contracts, the profits on which are not known.

been

been made or vessels hired by staff officers, the whole of the expenditure has gone through the hands of a commissary-general, controlled on the spot by a commissary of accounts; whose duty it is to inform himself, in the first instance, whether the expence was authorized by the Commander-in-chief; then to enquire attentively whether the price charged was the lowest at which the articles could have been purchased; the rate of exchange at which the bills are drawn; and, lastly, to examine the vouchers. These officers have been restrained from receiving any profits whatever beyond their fixed allowance of pay and provisions; the utmost care has been taken, in the whole course of the war, to select only such persons for the situations as were most capable of discharging the duty; and there is every reason to believe it has been performed in an exemplary manner.*

Not

* This Pamphlet had not been published many months before the expectation here expressed was most painfully disappointed. As soon, however, as circumstances occurred to justify suspicions of mal-practices in the West Indies, the most

Not a single contract has been entered into by the treasury, or under their authority, except for the camps at home which could be supplied in no other way; and these have been made by a public bidding, which pre-

most active proceedings took place at the Treasury as to the most effectual and immediate course of investigation; and communication was had with the Commissioners for auditing public accounts thereupon, who reported: "We are perfectly satisfied that no effectual examination of the said accounts so as to detect the frauds which are suspected to have been committed, can be made at this office, or *indeed in this country.*" Under so decided an opinion of persons beyond all comparison most competent to judge correctly on the subject, in which the Treasury entirely concurred (and in which the auditors afterwards stated they were strongly confirmed by subsequent examination of West-India accounts) an Act of Parliament was proposed and passed to appoint Commissioners to go to the West Indies for the purpose of discovering abuses and frauds in the Commissariate and other Expenditure; who went accordingly and proceeded with activity. Many difficulties however, occurred in punishing persons for frauds committed in that distant part of the world, but there is still reason to hope the offenders will be overtaken by Justice, and that the measures adopted will effectually prevent the recurrence of such crimes. The reader is referred to the Proceedings on the Finance Reports in 1799 and 1800, for proof of the attention of the Treasury to this subject.—D. p. 33, 35, 36 to 41—45 to 49. F. 34 to 53, and 54 to 68.

cludes all possibility of favour, and insures the lowest prices as far as is consistent with certainty of supply.

Transports, in the last as well as in some former wars, were taken up either by commission to individuals, evidently subject to abuse, or by the commissioners of the navy for general services, and by the respective Boards of Victualling and Ordnance for their own occasions; it was evident, however, that the competition which arose from the hiring by the several departments increased the expence; and the Navy Board finding it inconvenient to provide shipping for the whole, without neglecting other important duties, a Transport Board was revived:—that the duty has been well executed, will not be disputed. But the establishment has been objected to as superfluous;—to this objection, an extract from the answer of the commissioners to a reference to them on a passage in one of the Reports of the Finance-Committee of 1798, considering

sidering the characters of the members of that
 Board for ability and integrity, will, perhaps,
 not be an insufficient reply:—" In the con-
 " stant series of details which are included in
 " our business, and which are too numerous
 " to be particularly specified, we have saved
 " the public some hundred thousand pounds,
 " which we have reason to believe would, but
 " for our close and constant attention, have
 " been lost. We need only particularize
 " one circumstance, and that of a prominent
 " nature, for their lordships' observation. If
 " the Three Boards, who have heretofore been
 " engaged in the hire of transports for their
 " respective services, had each of them,
 " through the weight of business or want of
 " attention, taken up one ship of a moderate
 " size more than was necessary, or permitted
 " one vessel for each branch to have remained
 " unemployed, the pay of those transports,
 " exclusive of incidents, would have amount-
 " ed to more than the whole official charge of
 " this board, with the clerks, &c. employed
 " under it."

Another department, that of providing barracks for the troops created a few years ago, has been the subject of repeated discussion in parliament and of frequent observation without doors: every effort was used that ingenuity could devise to render the measure unpopular, and to impress on the public mind a persuasion, that immense sums of money were lavished without any apparent use or necessity. In a measure intimately connected with the safety and defence of the country, economy alone is not to be attended to: we are persuaded, however, the arrangement is to be justified even on this ground, and that, on an attentive consideration of the subject, it will be found there is a saving to the public during war, of about 400,000*l.* a year* by the system (after deducting the expences attending it) without taking into the calculation the

* See Appendix, No. 5.—As the affairs of this Department are now under investigation by the Commissioners of Military Enquiry, it is not thought advisable to make any remark on transactions in it since the publication of this Pamphlet in 1799.

great saving by the preservation of horses. In this, as in other instances, we must not lose sight of the nature of the war in which we are engaged; whatever reliance we may justly have on our navy, the glorious achievements of which have been above all praise as well as beyond all example, and on the powerful aid of our yeomanry incited by an unparalleled enthusiasm in the cause of their country, we should not neglect the attention due to our brave army and militia, at the same time that we employ their services in the stations best calculated for our defence. In many parts of the country the troops could not have been kept on the coast in winter, if barracks had not been provided; but what is most interesting to our feelings, and important to the state, is, the saving of the lives of the soldiers, by their being comfortably lodged in barracks, instead of being exposed to the consequences of encampments, particularly, late in the year. The advantages accruing to the discipline and good conduct of the army are obvious, even to common observers.

Among the interesting events which took place within the period we are reviewing, we must not pass in silence two which, when they first occurred, seemed to threaten the trading interest of the country with consequences of a most serious nature. We allude to the stagnation of the mercantile credit in 1793, and the suspension of payments in cash at the Bank in 1797. From the latter, indeed, apprehensions were, by some, entertained of almost national ruin. Early in 1793, from causes not necessary to investigate here, commerce met with a severe check for a time, from an extreme difficulty experienced in obtaining money, even by those whose fortunes were unquestionable. On such occasions, mischief is frequently produced much more by alarm than by real embarrassments; confidence failed to such a degree as to induce great numbers, who had a command of money, to keep it up so carefully, that there were many merchants and manufacturers who had warehouses filled with goods which they could neither sell or raise money upon.

In

In this state of things, recourse was had to Government for relief. The business was urgent, and would admit of no delay; a proposal was, therefore, made to Parliament, and an Act was passed, in May, authorizing the issue of exchequer bills to the amount of 5,000,000*l.* to such merchants, bankers, or traders, as should apply for the same. The commissioners, named in the Act, met the day after it received the Royal assent, and sat from day to day, till they had decided on all the applications. The effect, almost instantaneously produced, cannot be so well described as in the words of the commissioners, to whom very great commendation is due. They stated * that “ the knowledge that loans
 “ might have been obtained, sufficed, in several instances, to render them unnecessary :
 “ that the whole number of applications was
 “ 332, for sums amounting to 3,855,624*l.* ;
 “ of which, 238 were granted, amounting to

* Report of the Commissioners after they had finished their business.

“ 2,202,000*l.* ;

“ 2,202,000*l.*; 45, for sums to the amount
 “ of 1,215,100*l.* were withdrawn; and 49
 “ were rejected for various reasons. The
 “ whole sum advanced on loans was paid;
 “ a considerable part before it became due;
 “ and the remainder regularly at the stated
 “ periods, without apparent difficulty or dis-
 “ tress. With the exception of two only,
 “ who became bankrupts, the parties assisted
 “ were ultimately solvent, and in many in-
 “ stances possessed of great property.

“ The advantages of this well-timed mea-
 “ sure were evinced by a speedy restora-
 “ tion of confidence in mercantile transac-
 “ tions, which produced a facility in raising
 “ money that was presently felt, not only in
 “ the metropolis, but through the whole ex-
 “ tent of Great Britain.

“ The difficulties in which many consider-
 “ able commercial houses were involved, were
 “ thus removed, and the fatal effects of those
 “ difficulties,

“ difficulties, in other houses who were de-
 “ pendent on them, were prevented; nor was
 “ the operation of the Act less beneficial, with
 “ respect to a variety of eminent manufac-
 “ turers, in different parts of these kingdoms,
 “ who, having in a great degree suspended
 “ their works, were enabled to resume them,
 “ and to afford employment to a number of
 “ workmen, who must otherwise have been
 “ thrown on the public for support,—and per-
 “ haps, in some cases, with the loss of the
 “ manufacture.”

The commissioners then referred to the
 anxious care they had taken to preserve the
 most scrupulous secrecy, which succeeded so
 well, that the names of those, who applied
 for relief, are not known to this hour, ex-
 cept to the commissioners and the sureties for
 the respective debts.

We doubt if it has ever happened, that such
 essential benefit has been rendered to the
 commerce

commerce and manufactures of a country in a manner so sudden, so easy in execution, and (what is perhaps the least important consideration, compared with the magnitude of the object) at no expence to the public. It was so managed, that the difference between the interest paid by the borrowers at 5 per cent. and on the exchequer bills lent to them, for which the public paid twopence-halfpenny a day, satisfied all the expences of the commission, and left a profit of upwards of 4,000*l.* which was paid into the exchequer.

On the subject of the suspension of payment in cash at the Bank, we speak with considerable diffidence, as the doubts entertained at the time, respecting the causes which led to it, have never been distinctly cleared up. Enquiries were instituted, and reports made thereupon in both Houses of Parliament, where all the circumstances then known, that could bear in any degree on the

measure, were carefully examined into. It was stated that the expenditure for services abroad in 1795 and 1796, including the loan for the Emperor and the subsidy to Prussia, had been so great, as to occasion the foreign exchange, particularly with Hamburgh, to be unfavourable to this country during the whole of the former of these years, and till towards the end of the latter; that the advances from the Bank to Government had been very large on account of the pressing demands of the public service; * and it was suggested in both

* They were, including interest, on the 25th of February, 1797, as under (see Lords' Report of Committee of Secrecy, p. 178) :

Land and malt	£.5,937,000
Exchequer bills	2,291,000
Treasury bills	1,512,000
Interest on the whole . . .	554,000
	£.10,294,000

The unclaimed dividends, paid by the Bank for public service, to the amount of 376,000*l.* are of course not included in the above.

The Bank advances, in May, 1795, were 11,340,000*l.* (see
L
Lords'

both reports, more particularly in the Commons, that the apprehensions of invasion (generally prevalent towards the close of 1796) produced a very considerable effect. But, whatever might have been the remote causes, it seems perfectly clear that the stopping payments in cash of two great banks at Newcastle, owing to a local alarm which spread rapidly,* was the immediate occasion of the evil. The demands on the capital for cash were sudden, and increased almost daily. These rapid, continued, and unexampled drains, induced the Directors, towards the end of February, to communicate to the Ministers the situation of the Bank; and, on a

Lords' Report, p. 180); in December following, 12,846,000*l*. (Ibid. p. 184) : in the year 1782, they were 10,171,000*l*. (see Commons' Report Secrecy; p. 225) : and as early as 1753, in a time of profound peace, they were 11,686,000*l*. when the capital of the Bank was under 11,000,000*l*. (see Postlethwaite's History of the Revenue, p. 307 to 310) ; they had indeed been nearly as high during some years before.

* Third Report of the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons, p. 526.

full

full consideration of this communication, the minute of council was issued to suspend their payments in cash, the expediency of which was admitted by the Directors and Proprietors.*

The probable consequences of a measure so new in its nature, and so likely to excite considerable alarm, both in this country and on the continent, could in no way be prevented, or counteracted so effectually, as by an authentic and public statement of the property of the Bank. A Committee of the House of Commons was accordingly appointed; and, after a strict and accurate investigation, the result was, that there was a clear undisputed surplus of property, belonging to the Company, of more than 15,000,000l.†

It

* Lords' Report, p. 14.

† Funds belonging to the Bank, exclusive of
what was due from the public . . . £.17,597,280

Carried forward 17,597,280

It is not wonderful that, under a conviction of such solid and substantial wealth, the merchants, the bankers, and the traders of every description, should come forward with zeal and alacrity in support of the permanent credit of the Bank:—they did so, in a manner as honourable to themselves as advantageous to the country; and an association was entered into, to take and to pass bank-notes as specie. Parliament, also, having been satisfied of the solidity of the Company, by the Report of the Committee above alluded to, an Act was passed, on the 3d of May, 1797, confirming the minute of council which restrained the payments in cash, and conti-

	Brought forward	£.17,597,280
Debt from the public . . .	£.11,686,800	
Deduct amount of unclaimed dividends paid by the Bank for public service	376,000	
		11,310,800
		28,908,080
Outstanding demands on the Bank . . .	13,770,390	
Clear surplus of property . . .	15,137,690	
(First Report, Committee of Secrecy of Commons, p. 2.)		
		nuing

nuing that restraint (with some exceptions
 in favour of bankers to a limited amount) till
 the 24th of June in the same year ; previous
 to the expiration of which, another Act was
 passed, prolonging the restraint till one
 month after the commencement of the next
 session of Parliament ; but, in the latter Act,
 there was a clause permitting the Bank to
 receive cash for their notes in sums exceeding
 500*l.* upon an engagement to repay to the
 persons who should leave the same, during
 the restriction, three-fourths of the amount
 in cash, whenever they should call for it.
 Under the authority of that clause, very
 large sums were immediately poured into the
 Bank, and the influx has continued to be
 very great. The first Act in the next session
 of Parliament, 1797-8, continued the re-
 striction till one month after a definitive trea-
 ty of peace, with an authority however to
 the Directors, to pay in cash whenever they
 shall think right to do so ; since which (in
 the month of December, 1798), they decided
 to

to pay in money all sums under 5*l.* for demands upon them, whether for dividends, or otherwise, and called in all small notes under 1*l.* and 2*l.* issued by them antecedent to July 1798; but the specie demanded, in consequence thereof, has been perfectly trifling, in comparison with what it might have been.

By these wise and provident measures, all the apprehensions that were entertained have vanished; the credit of the Bank is as high, both at home and abroad, as it ever was; and not the slightest inconvenience possible is or has been experienced from its not paying in cash. On the other hand, the enemy were deprived of one great and leading inducement to keep up an appearance of invading us.*

It

* We had not then, as we have now, 200,000 yeomanry and infantry, well armed, clothed, and completely disciplined, in addition to our regular forces and militia.

The number of yeomanry, cavalry, and volunteer infantry, very greatly exceed that number at this time (July 1806.) To
what

It would be presumptuous to offer an opinion, or even to hazard a conjecture, concerning the causes which led to the consequences above stated, if circumstances had not occurred, during the two years that have elapsed since the enquiries by the Committees of both Houses, which throw some light on this subject, and lead to an opinion that the drains of the Bank were occasioned infinitely more by domestic alarms, than either by money having been sent out of the country, or an insufficient quantity of coin having been provided. The great and extraordinary demands from various parts of the world, from the commencement of the war to the end of 1796, amounting to upwards of 44,800,000*l*.^{*} might, at first view,

what they will be reduced, in 1807, by the measures lately adopted, I had rather leave to experience, than express any conjecture about; wishing to avoid every thing like controversy in a publication of this sort.

* For public services, including loans,	£.37,438,000
For corn	7,446,000

(See Lords' Report, p. 192 and 229.)	<u>44,884,000</u>
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be supposed to have occasioned much coin or bullion to have been sent out of the country ; but, when the immense extent of the export of British manufactures is considered, especially now their true value is known with more accuracy,* it will not be thought surprising that, upon the most attentive enquiry lately made, there is the strongest ground to be persuaded that the gold exported from Great Britain in the period last mentioned, did not amount in value to any thing approaching to 1,000,000*l.* including what was sent for the Imperial loan, and on private account.† British coin could only have been

* The inspector-general of the Customs, stated it as his opinion, to the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Lords, that the balance of our commerce amounted, on the medium of four years to January 1796, to 10,500,000*l.* per annum, including 4,000,000*l.* as the profits of our East and West India trade, on a supposition that the British manufactures exceeded the custom-house value about 30 per cent ; but, it has been since ascertained, by the entries under the Convoy Act, that 40 per cent. may be further added to this valuation.

† No gold was sent out of this country on account of the Prussian subsidy.

sent

sent out fraudulently, and with very great risk of seizure, as the most vigilant attention was paid to prevent the contraband practice at the time.

A strong presumption that guineas were not sent in any considerable quantities, is, that of the coin and bullion to the value nearly of 8,000,000*l.* brought into the country in 1797 and 1798, (of which, about 5,800,000*l.* was in gold,) there was not more than 70,000*l.* in English coin, although it would evidently have been more profitable for persons abroad to have sent guineas than ingots: if indeed it had been to their advantage to melt our coin on the continent, it would have been discovered at the mint, where ingots, composed of guineas, are easily distinguished from other gold by the alloy.

Another circumstance worthy of attention is, that, in proportion as confidence was restored, specie re-appeared; for it is a fact,

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which

which we believe will be admitted by every banker in the metropolis, that in the last summer, when the spirits of the country were raised to an unusual height, among other causes, by one of the most brilliant and important naval victories* that ever was atchieved by skill, perseverance, and courage, immense sums of money were brought to London from all parts of the kingdom, where much of it must have been hoarded.

The quantity of coin in a country is perhaps not the best test of its prosperity; but, we are persuaded, the amount circulating in his Majesty's dominions is at this time nearly 44,000,000*l.*: as that, however, exceeds former estimates we have seen, we refer our readers to the Appendix, No. 4, which will satisfy them the statement is not made too high.

* Even this has been since eclipsed by the ever-memorable action off Trafalgar, under the command of the same illustrious Hero.

We shall at present not dwell on the measure for the sale of the land-tax, as there has not yet been time to judge of its effect: In computing the farther increase of the revenue, therefore, no credit was taken for the annual profit of 10 per cent. which will accrue from the part of the tax sold; that will be to be added to future estimates when the amount shall be better known; but we conceive the sale of that revenue cannot possibly fail of being attended with benefits infinitely more important to the resources of the country, than any addition of income that can arise from it. There has not yet been time to experience, in any thing like the full extent, the benefit to be derived from the Act;—the difficulties however are daily disappearing, and there is good reason to believe that the sale will succeed to a considerable extent, and that the public credit will experience the good effects of the plan in a short time.

One measure is still wanting to secure the
M 2 foreign

foreign commerce we have, and to afford the best chance of extending it considerably; it is therefore anxiously to be wished, that no private interests or personal considerations of any sort, may interfere to prevent the accomplishment of so great a good to the country as the establishment of a warehousing system in it. If accommodation should not be immediately provided, in the port of London, for ships to discharge and take in their cargoes with facility and dispatch, the measure alluded to cannot be effectual; and there is too much reason to fear that much of the trade will in that event not only be driven from the Capital, but will be lost to the kingdom*.

* The Warehousing Act, which has since been passed, and the stupendous Works completed in the last six years, at the West-India Docks, the London Docks, and the East-India Docks, have removed all dangers of this sort: there is not in the whole world any thing that can be brought in comparison with them, either for extent or accommodation. In the three Docks before-mentioned, there are more than one hundred acres of water, and Warehouses in proportion.

The

The efforts lately made by the country are not the transient and temporary exertion of its means to answer an occasional emergency; by adhering to the same wise and provident measures which have lately been adopted, the mischievous effects which would otherwise have attended the increased amount of the Public Debt, have been, and will continue to be, prevented. This is a truth so important, that it cannot be too often or in too many shapes exhibited for the satisfaction of our country, for the conviction of our enemies, and for the information of Europe. If France has built hopes (founded on ignorant or visionary calculations) on the expected overthrow of our financial system, and has trusted to the failure of our resources, she may now perceive what means, after so many years of this arduous struggle, Great Britain still possesses for maintaining it. It would be a slander on the sense and virtue of the people, to suppose an abatement of that spirit which has enabled Government to call
forth

forth those resources. The prosperous state of the empire which affords the power, furnishes also the motive, for continuing the contest; a contest, the support of which to a successful issue is to secure us in the enjoyment of every national advantage, and to protect us from the infliction of every national calamity.

We trust we have established satisfactorily, by clear and distinct evidence, our assumption of the present favourable state of the country in revenue, commerce, and manufacture; and we hope it will be admitted, that it was neither unfounded nor over-rated. The correctness of the statements, adduced in support of that position, will not, it is believed, be disputed; they are given in such a manner as, we flatter ourselves, may be convincing to the most scrutinizing, and plain to the most ignorant; and indeed, from the clear and unembarrassed shape in which the public accounts are now annually exhibited to Parliament, and the
able

able and distinct reports which have been lately made by a Committee of the House of Commons, misrepresentation must be immediately detected. If the reference of this favourable situation to the measures above recapitulated shall be controverted, it will be for the country to judge of its justness. We are more interested for the *end* than for the *means*, except in so far as the continued exercise of such means may produce equal or increasing advantages to the empire.

The imperious and awful necessity of the present crisis unavoidably subjects us to heavy burthens.—It has been said that they ought to be considered but as a *salvage* for the remaining part of our property.—In the consideration of property, to which it was applied, the figure is sufficiently striking; but, in other respects, the metaphor, though just, is inadequate. What Tariff shall settle the difference between national independence and inexorable tyranny? between personal liberty
 3 and

and requisitions, prisons, and murder?—between the blessed comforts of religion and the gloomy despair of atheism?

In looking on the view we have endeavoured to give of the state of the country, of its established credit, its productive industry, the unequalled extent of its commerce and navigation, and the consequent unrivalled power of its navy, our countrymen will, with a well-founded partiality, impute the advantages we enjoy to a Constitution fitted to produce them; and, contemplating the prosperity of Great Britain with honest exultation, will feel that Constitution more than ever endeared to their affections, more than ever intitled to their strenuous and united exertions to defend and to secure it.

HAVING in this and the former pamphlet traced the progressive increase in our Revenue, Manufactures, Commerce, and Navigation, from 1784 to 1799, it was once my intention to carry on the investigation in the same manner to the present time; but I have been prevented from doing so by an apprehension that such a further detail would from its length prevent attention to it. I have however continued the Tables of the Revenue, &c. through Mr. Addington's administration, as well as Mr. Pitt's, to the present time, as highly interesting to all who are anxious for the prosperity of the country. It will from these be seen what the situation of

the country was in these respects at the commencement of this year; or in other words, when the present ministers succeeded to the government; and the reader will be able to compare that with the state in which Mr. Pitt found it when he came into office. It has been shewn in the pamphlet printed in 1792, that when Mr. Pitt succeeded to the head of the Treasury at the end of December 1783, he had it not in his power, owing to the political struggles which then prevailed, to propose any efficient measures till the new parliament met in May 1784:

That the income of the permanent taxes was at that time insufficient to pay the charges upon it; of course the whole of the land and malt taxes (about 2,560,000*l.*) was not applicable to meet the current expences of the country for army, navy, ordnance, miscellaneous services, &c. :

That

That the interest of the debt in-			
curred in the American war,			
then just ended, was	-	£.4,864,000	
And the taxes imposed to provide			
for it were so unproductive,			
that the increase of revenue			
was only	-	-	1,755,000
Leaving a deficiency of	-	£.3,109,000	

And in addition to the discouragement necessarily resulting from the new taxes being so unproductive, the funds were in a state of the utmost depression: the three per cents which, on the peace of 1763, rose to 95l. never rose higher after the peace of 1783 than 69l. and had fallen in the beginning of 1784 to 56l. at which time the unfunded debt to be provided for amounted to 27,000,000l. exclusive of 2,000,000l. of loyalists debentures.

Under all these disadvantages and difficulties, it is proved in the same pamphlet, that Mr. Pitt, in less than two years and a half from his entering

entering into office, proposed to parliament the establishment of a sinking fund of one million annually, which, with the aid of a subsequent improvement in 1792, amounts now to more than eight millions a year; not one shilling of which was diverted by him from the important objects for which it was established, under pressures the most serious the country ever experienced. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say, that to this measure we owe our existence at this time as a nation.

Let us next look to the unerring evidence of the state of our navigation and commerce at the periods of his coming into office, and at his death.

NAVIGATION.	1784.	1805.
	Tons.	Tons.
Shipping belonging to Great Britain and her colonies, Ireland not in- cluded - -	1,301,000	2,226,000
Number of seamen employed in that shipping, in the merchants' service	101,870	152,642

COM-

COMMERCE.

	1784.	1805.
Imports from British colonies, and	£.	£.
from possessions in India -	6,751,000	13,271,000
Ditto from Ireland -	1,820,000	3,010,000
Ditto from Foreign countries	6,573,000	13,221,000
	15,144,000	29,502,000

1784. Exports of British	
manufactures to British	
possessions -	3,757,000
to Foreign coun-	
tries - -	7,517,000
	11,274,000

Ditto, 1804. to British
possessions - 9,322,000

Ditto to Foreign coun-
tries - - 14,613,000 23,935,000

Ditto of Foreign merchandize 3,846,000 12,227,000

[The above are the Custom-house
valuations, according to rules
established more than a century
ago.]

The real value of exports of British
manufactures exported in the two
periods were - 18,603,000 41,068,000

FISHERIES.

Value of produce imported 127,000 434,000

THE FUNDS.

The price of the 3 per cent. consols in a period
of profound peace, the beginning of 1784,

were $\frac{5}{8}$ - $\frac{5}{8}$ 56 $\frac{7}{8}$ to 55 $\frac{7}{8}$
In

In December 1805, after thirteen years from the commencement of the war, with an in- terval of less than two years of feverish	£.	£.
peace	60	to 61

This state of the funds can be attributed only to the increased wealth of the country, by the vast extension of our commerce, and to the sacred adherence to the legal provisions for the application of the sinking fund. It may perhaps be urged that, admitting the accuracy of these statements, Mr. Pitt added immensely to the burdens on the people;—how far it was possible for him to avoid the long war we have been carrying on, which led to the necessity of his doing so, must be left to the judgment of an impartial and enlightened public;* it is impossible to enter on that topic here, without going into a

* An attentive perusal of “Marsh’s Politics respecting the war with France,” will leave no doubt on that point in the mind of any human being, unless he is determined not to be convinced of the forbearance of Great Britain; as Mr. Marsh’s proofs of the unprovoked and often repeated aggressions of France, carry with them mathematical demonstration.

length that would defeat the present object ; but it must at least be admitted, that those burthens have been imposed with much judgment and fairness, after the unequivocal proof adduced (by the failure of Lord North's taxes) of the extent to which the country was exhausted at the period of Mr. Pitt's entering into office ; when we recollect, that although the taxes imposed since 1792 have produced a very large surplus above the charge they were to meet, they have not prevented a great increase of those before existing ; having in view also, that notwithstanding the many new, and the considerable additions to the old taxes, the number of revenue officers was not increased ; without taking into the account eighty-five patent sinecure employments in the revenue, from 100l. to 2000l. a year in value, entirely unconnected with Mr. Burke's reform, exclusive of some other patent offices of great value, which were for ever abolished by Mr. Pitt. But it has been said that advantages, such as we have stated, are beneficial only to the merchants,

chants, manufacturers, and stockholders ; a very little reflection, however, on the facts here adduced, will lead to a persuasion that they have, from actual experience, been attended with consequences equally beneficial to gentlemen of landed property ; and that the means for the defence of the country have been essentially thereby improved. We allude as to the first, to the rise of rents by the increased demand for the produce of the land, consequent on the extension of our trade and manufactures ; and to the sale prices of land, by the number of merchants and manufacturers, who, having gained immense wealth, have become purchasers. At the end of the American war twenty-years purchase was as common a price for estates as thirty years is now.

On perusing the pamphlet now re-printed, it will not have escaped the observation of the reader, that Mr. Pitt entirely relinquished the system of contracts and commission for the purchase of provisions and stores of every kind, and of private
loans ;

loans; all which had, during the several wars in the last century, been a source of great influence to the minister, and of immense profit to individuals, at the public expence. The purchases in the whole of the last and present wars have been made by the victualling and transport boards; and the loans were made, without favour to any one, by public biddings. Let these facts here plainly stated, be considered candidly and attentively, and those who most revere the memory of Mr. Pitt will have reason to be perfectly satisfied with the result.

Respecting the means for the defence of the country, we need only refer to the addition of more than forty-six thousand seamen to our stock, without dwelling on the increase of our population, and the facility given to recruiting from the immense extension of our manufactories.

I HAVE

I HAVE hitherto confined myself to matters within the immediate department over which Mr. Pitt presided ; but considering the pre-eminence he long held in the Councils of His Majesty, and that unhappily for the country he is no longer among us, I may I hope be allowed to refer very shortly to some of the principal matters that occurred during the eventful period of his administration, and to say a few words respecting his character.

If we look to naval and military operations it will be seen, with no small degree of astonishment as well as satisfaction, that in the period referred to we took and destroyed more ships of the line of our enemies* than in all the wars we

* These amounted to 110 ships of the line ; while those in the former wars were in number only 109. In this comparison the ships destroyed in the very arduous enterprize at Copenhagen are not included, although the expedition was equipped under Mr. Pitt's government, nor several ships of the line lost in a storm when the invasion of Ireland was attempted.

have been engaged in since the Revolution, viz. those in the reign of King William, Queen Anne, during the hostilities with Spain in the reign of George the First, (when the fleet of Spain was destroyed in the Mediterranean), in the wars of 1742, of 1756, and the American war.

That the French under their Emperor Buona-
parte were driven out of Egypt by an inferior
army, composed of troops from the banks of the
Thames, and of the Ganges, who met in that
country and there gained immortal honour;
and that they were deprived of every foot of
land they had on the continent of India, as well
as of almost all their colonies in the West Indies;
and that many of those of Spain and Holland
were taken by the British arms, while the nu-
merous and extensive possessions of Great
Britain in all parts of the world were completely
protected.

Nor should the perils with which the country
and

view, we shall not have less reason to admire the character and to revere the memory of one of the most able, firm, virtuous, and disinterested men that ever lived in any nation or in any time. His conduct during the long and dangerous illness of our beloved Sovereign in 1788—9, will not soon be forgotten by his grateful countrymen. It is the pride of the British Constitution, as now understood and administered, that the personal interest of the monarch is so much identified with the interests of the people, that the latter feel every circumstance tending to the health, the comfort, or the dignity of their Sovereign, as a favourite acquisition to themselves: And I think I may venture to say, there never was a period of more genuine national joy than when our beloved King, after a considerable interval of alarming indisposition, was restored to the enjoyment of health, and to the exercise of his public functions. The ships destroyed in the very arduous enterprize at Copenhagen are not included, although the expedition was equipped under Mr. Pitt's government, nor several ships of the line lost in a storm when the invasion of Ireland was attempted.

ha

An intention is entertained of a history of Mr. Pitt's whole life being given to the public : in the mean time I trust I shall be excused in making some very short observations respecting him, as few had better, perhaps none so frequent, opportunities of forming a judgment on the subject in the last two-and-twenty years of his life, during which period I had the happiness to possess his affectionate friendship and perfect confidence, without the slightest or shortest interruption.

To those who enjoyed his intimacy I might safely refer for the proof of his possessing those private virtues and We rejoice that the danger

“ Which overcame us like a summer cloud,”

was too short to give all the effect to his services which circumstances less favourable might have shewn them calculated to produce.

Nor should the perils with which the country
and

view, we shall not have less reason to admire the character and to revere the memory of one of the most able, firm, virtuous, and disinterested men that ever lived in any nation or in any time. His conduct during the long and dangerous illness of our beloved Sovereign in 1788—9, will not soon be forgotten by his grateful countrymen. It is the pride of the British Constitution, as now understood and administered, that the personal interest of the monarch is so much identified with the interests of the people, that the latter feel every circumstance tending to the health, the comfort, or the dignity of their Sovereign, as a favourite ac-tortitude of mind, which nevð I think I may the most trying occasions, and with which he met the difficulties of his own and of the public situation, will be now remembered, as at the time they were acknowledged, as not less admirable in themselves than important in their consequences.

An

An intention is entertained of a history of Mr. Pitt's whole life being given to the public : in the mean time I trust I shall be excused in making some very short observations respecting him, as few had better, perhaps none so frequent, opportunities of forming a judgment on the subject in the last two-and-twenty years of his life, during which period I had the happiness to possess his affectionate friendship and perfect confidence, without the slightest or shortest interruption.

To those who enjoyed his intimacy I might safely refer for the proof of his possessing those private virtues and endowments, which, though they may sometimes be accounted foreign to the public character of a statesman, the congenial feelings of Englishmen always dispose them to regard as the best pledges of a minister's upright administration. Around these in the present case an additional lustre, as well as sacredness, has been thrown by the circumstances
of

of his death ; by the manner in which he met it ; and by the composure, the fortitude, the resignation, and the religion, which marked his last moments. With a manner somewhat reserved and distant in what might be termed his public deportment, no man was ever better qualified to gain, or more successful in fixing the attachment of his friends, than Mr. Pitt : They saw all the powerful energies of his character softened into the most perfect complacency and sweetness of disposition in the circles of private life, the pleasures of which no one more cheerfully enjoyed or more agreeably promoted, when the paramount duties he conceived himself to owe to the public admitted of his mixing in them. That indignant severity with which he met and subdued what he considered unfounded opposition ; that keenness of sarcasm with which he repelled and withered (as it might be said) the powers of most of his assailants in debate, were exchanged in the society of his intimate friends
for

for a kindness of heart, a gentleness of demeanor, and a playfulness of good humour, which no one ever witnessed without interest, or participated without delight. His mind which, in the grasp and extent of its capacity, seized with a quickness almost intuitive all the most important relations of political power and political œconomy, was not less uncommonly susceptible of all the light and elegant impressions which form the great charm of conversation to cultivated minds.

This sensibility to the enjoyments of private friendship greatly enhanced the sacrifice he made of every personal indulgence and comfort to a rigid performance of duty to the public; that duty, for the last year of his life, was indeed of the most laborious and unremitting kind. The strength of his attachment to his Sovereign, and the ardour of his zeal for the welfare of his country, led him to forego not only every pleasure and amusement, but almost

every pause and relaxation of business necessary to the preservation of *health*, till it was too late, in a frame like his, alas ! for the preservation of *life*!! That life he sacrificed to his country, not certainly like another most valuable and illustrious servant of the public, (whose death has been deeply and universally lamented) amidst those animating circumstances in which the incomparable hero often ventured it in battle, and at last resigned it for the most splendid of all his unexampled victories ; but with that patriotic self-devotedness which looks for a reward only in its own consciousness of right, and in its own secret sense of virtue.

The praise of virtue, of honour, and of disinterested purity, whether in public or private character, need scarcely be claimed for his memory ; for those, his enemies (if he now has any, which I am unwilling to believe, although some are frequently endeavouring to depreciate
his

his merits) will not venture to deny; and his country, in whose cause they were exercised to the last, will know how to value and record them. That they should be so valued and recorded is important on every principle of justice to the individual and of benefit to the community. To an upright minister in Great Britain, zealous for the interest and honour of his country, there is no reward of profit, emolument, or patronage, which can be esteemed a compensation for the labours, the privations, the anxieties, or the dangers of his situation: it is in the approbation of his sovereign, and in the suffrage of his countrymen, added to his own conviction of having done every thing to deserve it, that he must look for that reward which is to console him for all the cares and troubles of his station; the opposition of rivals; the mis-representation of enemies; the desertion or peevishness of friends; and sometimes the mistaken censures of the people. 'Tis the honourable ambition that looks beyond the
present

present time that must create, encourage, and support a virtuous and enlightened statesman;— that must confer on his mind the uprightness and purity that rise above all self-advantage; the courage that guards the state from foreign hostility or internal faction; the firmness that must often resist the wishes, to ensure the safety, of the people.

This is the legitimate ambition of a statesman; and that Mr. Pitt possessed it his friends are convinced; but he has been sometimes accused (by those who, although their opposition was active and systematic, yet knew how to honour the man) of a less laudable and less patriotic ambition, that wished “to reign alone,” to exclude from the participation of office and of power other men, whose counsels might have assisted him to guide the country amidst its difficulties and embarrassments, or might have contributed to its safety in the hour of its danger. It is however perfectly well known

known to some of the highest characters in the kingdom, that Mr. Pitt, after the resignation of Mr. Addington, in the summer of 1804, was most anxiously desirous that Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox should form a part of the new administration, and pressed their admission into office in that quarter where only such earnestness could be effectual; conceiving the forming a strong government as important to the public welfare, and as calculated to call forth the united talents, as well as the utmost resources of the empire: in which endeavour he persisted till within a few months of his death. I am aware of the delicacy of such a statement, but I am bold in the certainty of its truth. My profound respect for those by whom such averment, if false, might be contradicted, would not suffer me to make it, were it not called for to do justice to that great and virtuous statesman, whose unrivalled qualities, both in private and in public life, will ever be in my recollection

“Dum memor ipse mei, dum spiritus hos regit artus.”

APPENDIX, No. 2.

An Account of the several Dates when the Old Sinking Fund will have increased to its greatest Amount, 4,000,000*l.* a year (adding thereto the 200,000*l.* annually voted by Parliament): also the Dates when the whole Amount of the Debt incurred before the Year 1793 will be redeemed, by the operation of the Sinking Fund, according to the several Average Prices at which the 3 per Cent. Funds may hereafter be purchased.

<i>Average prices of the 3 per cent. funds, from the 1st Feb. 1799.</i>	<i>Dates when the Sinking Fund will have increased to 4,000,000<i>l.</i> its greatest amount.</i>	<i>Dates when the whole of the debt incurred before the year 1793 will be cancelled.</i>
55	November, 1808	October, 1832
60	August, 1809	October, 1835
65	April, 1810	September, 1838
70	February, 1811	August, 1841
75	February,* 1808	June, 1842
80	February, 1808	April, 1844
85	February, 1808	January, 1846
90	February, 1808	January, 1848
100	February, 1808	May, 1852

Excess above 4,200,000*l.* in the First Year after the Old Sinking Fund shall attain its Maximum, according to the Prices of Stock as under.

75 <i>l.</i>	-	23,600 <i>l.</i>	85 <i>l.</i>	-	376,800 <i>l.</i>
80	-	203,300	90	-	488,400
		100 <i>l.</i>		-	643,900 <i>l.</i>

• It is obvious that, in some cases, the sinking fund will increase to its greatest amount sooner with the stocks at a high price than at a lower one, by the reduction of the 5 per cents. or 4 per cents.

APPENDIX, No. 3.

Account of the several Periods of Time in which each Capital of Public Debt, bearing Interest at 3, 4, and 5 per Cent. per Annum respectively, will be redeemed by an annual Fund of 1 per Cent. applied by quarterly Issues, in purchasing the said Capitals at the several Average Prices at which the 3 per Cent. Funds may be redeemable, as stated underneath.

	Periods of redeeming by a Sinking Fund of 1 per cent. per annum, issued by quarterly payments, a Capital of Debt bearing interest.					
<i>Average Prices of the 3 per cent. Funds.</i>	<i>At 3 per cent. per annum.</i>		<i>At 4 per cent. per annum.</i>		<i>At 5 per cent. per annum.</i>	
	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Months.</i>	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Months.</i>	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Months.</i>
50	23	$3\frac{1}{4}$	27	$0\frac{1}{4}$	30	1
55	25	7	29	$8\frac{1}{2}$	33	$0\frac{3}{4}$
60	27	$10\frac{3}{4}$	32	4 ³	36	$0\frac{3}{4}$
65	30	$2\frac{1}{2}$	35	$0\frac{3}{4}$	39	$0\frac{1}{2}$
70	32	$6\frac{1}{4}$	37	9	42	$0\frac{1}{4}$
75	34	10	40	$5\frac{1}{4}$	45	$0\frac{1}{4}$
80	37	$1\frac{3}{4}$	43	$1\frac{1}{2}$	48	0
85	39	$5\frac{1}{2}$	45	$9\frac{1}{2}$	50	$11\frac{3}{4}$
90	41	$9\frac{1}{4}$	48	$5\frac{3}{4}$	53	$11\frac{3}{4}$
95	44	$0\frac{3}{4}$	51	2	56	$11\frac{1}{2}$
100	46	$4\frac{1}{2}$	53	$10\frac{1}{4}$	59	$11\frac{1}{4}$


APPENDIX, No. 6.

The Average Discount allowed by the Navy-Office on
Navy-Bills bearing Interest, was

	£.	s.	d.			£.	s.	d.	
In 1777	0	10	0	In 1794	- - - - -	2	2	6	
1778	6	4	2	1795	January to end				
1779	8	10	7	of Sept.	- -	2	15	0	
1780	11	9	0	October	- -	2	13	6	
1781	12	1	10	November	-	3	4	1	
1782	11	7	0	December	-	3	14	9	
1783	14	6	0	1796	January	- -	4	4	9
1784	16	14	2	Feb. & March		5	1	11	
				April	- - - -	5	14	5	
				May	- - - -	5	2	3	
				June	- - - -	6	11	11	
				July	- - - -	8	13	1	
				August	- -	10	3	11	
				September	-	14	7	3	
				October	- -	10	17	0	

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Rose, George
A brief examination into the increase
of the revenue...

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
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